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Legislative Redistricting 
The following is reprint of the speech prepared for delivery by 
Assistant Attorney General John R. Dunne of the u.s. Justice 
Department's Civil Rights Division. These remark.s, entitled 
"Reapportionment," were made in August at the annual meeting of the 
National Conference of State Legislatures held in Orlando, Fla. 
Thank.s to the NCSL for providing a copy of this speech. 
It's a distinct pleasure to address this conference on 
reapportionment -- a topic which has special meaning to me both in 
my present position and as a former state legislator who served a 
good long time in the New York State Senate. I remember well, having 
to endure with anxiety what seemed like an interminable wait while 
the practitioners of the arcane science -- electoral redistricting-
- performed their mystical handiwork and determine my political 
survival. The outcome, as you well know, could, and did, cost a fair 
share of officeholders their jobs. 
I was first elected during a special election held to implement a 
redistricting plan required by the Supreme Court's "one-man, one-
vote" ruling. Later, I watched -- often quite nervously -- as my 
district was repeatedly redrawn to reflect the results of both the 
1970 and the 1980 Censuses. Thus, although I now p 1 ay a very 
different role, I have not forgotten what it's like to be in your 
shoes as you prepare for the legislative and congressional 
redistrictings that lie ahead -- a task which, due to legal and 
technological developments, is perhaps the most difficult and 
controversial that it has ever been. 
To help you in that process -- and keep in mind, I am from 
Washington and I'm here to help you -- I want to talk about the 
Civil Rights Divisions and our role in enforcing the Voting Rights 
Act. 
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The Voting Rights Act, was enacted over 25 years ago in response to 
a long and sorry history of oppression of racial minorities, was 
passed for one very special purpose: To eliminate the cornerstone 
of that system of oppression by ovlawing all racially 
discriminatory voting rules, so that minorit1es in this nation would 
be able to attain their fair share of political power and thereby 
gain the ability not only to protect themselves from other forms of 
oppression, but to advance their interests through the political 
process, as well. 
There are two sections of the Voting Rights Act which have a direct 
impact on the redistricting process and, by their combined effect, 
require compliance by every state in the Union: 
First, under Section 5 -- the pre-clearance section -- redistricting 
plans from certain specific states III or local jurisdictions 121 
must be reviewed -- either by a three-judge Federal District Court 
in Washington or by the Department of Justice -- to determine 
whether the state has proven, as it must, that the plan satisfies 
the mandate of the Voting Rights Act, namely, that it be free of 
racially d i scrimi.natory purpose and effect. Following the 1980 
Census, we imposed Section 5 objections to and refused to pre-clear 
24 statewide congressional and legislative redistrictings. Most of 
the objections involved the dilution of minority voting strength 
through either the fragmentation or the packing of a politically 
cohesive and geographically concentrated racial. or language 
minority, coupled with the· state's failure to prove that the 
dilution was not motivated, at least in part, by a racially 
discriminatory purpose. In not one instance has the three judge 
court reversed a pre-clearance objection issued by the Justice 
Department. Thus, the experience has clearly established that 
covered jurisdictions must satisfy the Civil Rights Division that 
their redistricting plans comply with the statutory and 
constitutional requirements for racial fairness before they can put 
them into effect. As a result, Section 5 have proven to be a potent 
weapon in fighting racially discriminatory reapportionment plans. 
I should also tell you that if a jurisdiction were to commence a 
declaratory judgment action before a three-judge Federal District 
Court in Washington, D.C. in order to secure pre-clearance, rather 
than following the conventional, quicker, and less formal procedure 
of administrative pre-clearance, we would treat the action as we 
would any adversarial proceeding. We would be prepared to engage in 
extensive discovery, including interrogatories, requests for 
production of documents and depositions. We would force the state to 
meet its burden of proof at trial, subject its witnesses to 
extensive cross-examination, put on our own witnesses and experts 
and, in short, litigate the case to the fullest extent necessary to 
make certain that the submitting jurisdiction met its burden under 
the law. 
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With those basic principles in mind for Section 5 pre-clearance, let· 
us look at Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act which requires that 
all redistricting plans across the country -- not merely in those 
that are subject to Section 5 -- provide minority citizens with 
equal opportunity to participate in the political process and the 
opportunity to elect representatives of their choice. As Congress 
made clear in the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, and as 
the Supreme Court reiterated in 1986 in Thornburgh V. Gingles when 
it first construed those amendments, this means that proof of 
intentional discrimination is not required to vitiate a plan -- a 
redistricting plan violates the Voting Rights Act if it simply has 
a discriminatory result. Thus, the relevant legal standard today is 
whether the redistricting plan results in discrimination, even if 
those who drew and approved the lines had no discriminatory intent 
and thought they were creating districts that were fair to all 
minorities. Either infirmity, discriminatory purpose or 
discriminatory result, is sufficient to condemn a plan. Clearly, 
then, the difficulty of the redistricting task is immense and we in 
the Civil Rights Division stand ready to help you in any way we can 
in this effort. 
Let me turn first to some practical considerations in the 
administration of the Voting Rights Act. Our best estimate is that 
the department will receive over 1,000 submissions of redistricting 
plans before the end of the year, with an even greater number in the 
years that follow. At the same time, we plan to exercise our 
authority under Section 2 and examine plans adopted in states that 
are not subject to Section 5 review. Although redistricting in 
response to a decennial census is hardly new, the process, this time 
around, is unlike any other we have seen, due to all of the legal, 
social and technological advances that have occurred during the past 
decade. In preparation for reviewing these plans, we have acquired 
the most up-to-date, state of the art computer hardware and 
software. Thus, we are prepared to handle what could be an avalanche 
of complex proposals. In addition, we have a seasoned team of Voting 
Rights experts, led by two veterans each with 30 years experience, 
who have been though two rounds of decennial redistrictings. Thus, 
we have the t reaps and the equipment to take on what might be 
dubbed: "Redistricting Storm!" 
Let me just note a few of the changes that will affect virtually 
every reapportionment plan in the nation. 
First: In most parts of the country, the question is no 1 anger 
whether the voices of racial and language minorities will be heard 
in the redistricting process. They will. As a result of the progress 
that has been made since the passage of the Voting Rights Act, 
black, Hispanic and other minority legislators have taken their 
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rightful place firmly in the legislative halls that will fashion the 
political boundaries for the 1990's. Consider that in 1970, only 
1,469 blacks held elective office. By January of 1990, there were 
five times that number of black elected official in this country. We 
have already seen, from early submissions that the input of minority 
legislators and their constituents affected redistricting proposals 
and alternatives as they were developed and examined and debated. 
Second: Due to the wonders of computer technology, legislators, as 
well as those outside the legislative process, will have a much 
wider selection of alternative districting plans than in the past. 
These alternative plans will be susceptible to faster and more 
specific political analysis, not only by legislative players, but 
a 1 so by those p 1 ayers on the outside trying to influence the 
process. Everyone involved will have access to more knowledge about 
the political and racial implications of every redistricting option. 
And the states must be prepared to explain and defend their plans in 
light of that heightened scrutiny. That means justifying their 
rejection of certain alternatives as well as the adoption of a 
specific plan. Every group or any concerned citizen with a home 
computer and basic software will be able to draw its own alternative 
plan. Moreover, all will have access to sophisticated programs and 
illustrative graphics ready to revea 1 the po 1 it i ca 1 and minority 
impact of every permutation that you do -- or do not -- consider. 
Move a district line one block north or one block south and I assure 
you that someone will have a color chart and tables of statistics to 
show the impact. And you'll see similar presentations analyzing the 
failure to move that same district line one block north or south. 
Third: The substantive standards for enforcing Section 5 clearance 
of the Voting Rights Act have become clearer. We have gone through 
two sets of decennial redistrictings under the act and have received 
guidance from the courts on how the 1982 amendments to Section 2 
apply to redistricting plan. The Supreme Court's landmark decision 
in Thornburg V. Gingles provides exhaustive guidance on interpreting 
the Voting Rights Act. And in 1987, the department issues guidelines 
under Section 5 detailing the substantial standards we apply. 
Basically, these guidelines set forth three inquiries that we pursue 
in our Section 5 analysis. First, we ask whether the jurisdiction 
has met its burden to prove that the plan does not have a 
retrogressive effect, that is, that the plan does not reduce 
minority voting strength from the level that minorities enjoyed 
under the prior plan. As a practical matter, we see few if any plans 
that are retrogressive. 
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Second, we ask whether the jurisdiction has proven that the plan was 
not motivated, in whole or in part, by a racially discriminatory 
purpose. Because the concept of discriminatory purpose is so central 
to our work, let me pause here for a minute and explain what I mean. 
A discriminatory purpose means a design or desire to restrict a 
minority group's voting strength, that is, the ability of that group 
to elect candidates of its choice, below the level which that 
minority group might otherwise have enjoyed. Discriminatory purpose 
does not mean racial animus. As Judge Kozinski of the 9th Circuit 
noted in the Garza case, legislators who harbor no ill will at all 
toward minorities would nevertheless be engaging in purposeful 
discrimination if they fragmented a minority community in order to 
protect incumbents who might be voted out of office if the minority 
voters were able to elect the candidates of their choice. 
On the other hand, discriminatory purpose does not mean the 
intentional adoption of a plan that gives a minority group control 
of less than a proportional or maximum number of districts. A 
minority group is not automatically entitled to a proportional 
redistricting plan. Disparate effects alone, even when they are 
totally foreseen, do not equal discriminatory purpose under Section 
5, although they may be a problem under Section 2. 
Disparate effects, however, do need to be explained in a Section 5 
submission so that we can be sure that the state has satisfied its 
burden of proving the absence of racially discriminatory purpose. 
If, for example, a minority group's proposed plan is rejected, we 
must be satisfied that the jurisdiction made its decision for a 
valid, non-racial reason and that the plan was not rejected because 
it was favorable for the minority group. 
Third, we ask whether the jurisdiction's plan clearly violates 
Section 2 of the act under the standards set forth by Congress and 
the courts. 
Without attempting to be exhaustive, let me just outline for you 
some of the redistricting practices we look for in deciding whether 
there may be a violation of the Voting Rights Act: 
1. Packing a racial or ethnic minority group into only one 
district where that minority might have been able to elect 
candidates in two or three less concentrated districts. 
2. The obverse side of that issue: Fragmenting or splitting a 
geographically compact minority group into two or more 
districts where they will constitute an electoral minority. 
3. Reducing the percent of minorities in a district where the 
minority voters have previously been able to elect candidates 
of their choice by only a very slim margin. 
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4. Maintaining the re-election chance of those in control of the 
redistricting processing by preserving the old district lines 
to the greatest extent possible at the expense of minority 
voters. 
5. Altering district boundaries to shore up, for the majority 
group, previously marginal or competitive districts where 
minority voters were almost, but not quite, able to elect a 
preferred candidate. 
6. In open districts, where there is no incumbent, drawing the 
boundaries of the district so that the minority group is at a 
distinct disadvantage in electing its preferred candidate. 
7. Inexplicably deviating from the redistricting criteria that 
the state claims it used in drawing the boundary lines. 
8. Excluding minority groups from the process of drawing the 
plan, or merely paying 11 lip service 11 to them by soliciting, 
but then ignoring, the minority groups's input and then 
providing no rationale for rejecting the minority group's 
redistricting proposal, and, finally, 
9. The unexplained or arbitrary use of multi-member districts. 
This is neither a hard-and-fast list nor an exhaustive one. I offer 
it merely as a helpful guide in evaluating redistricting plans. Many 
plans that suffer from one or more of those i ndi caters may be 
accepted; but the presence of too many should lead you to re-examine 
the impact that a proposed plan may have. It is my hope that the 
states will insist that any plan submitted to them for consideration 
complies with the Voting Rights Act. 
Let me describe some recent decisions that we have made under 
Section 5 which illustrate how we apply the principles I have just 
outlined. 
In Louisiana, the proposed maps for the State House and Senate 
fragmented black population concentrations in two areas in the 
Senate and seven in the House, despite proposals by the minority 
community that would have kept. those concentrations intact and 
created viable minority districts. We interposed an objection 
because our analysis revealed that, on balance, the evidence as to 
each of these areas suggested that the legislature's decisions had 
been motivated by a desire to protect incumbents at the expense of 
minority representation. Obvious 1 y, protecting incumbents is not 
illegal in and of itself, but the law is clear that it is not a 
valid reason for rejecting feasible alternatives that would give 
minority voters an opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. 
Again, as Judge Kozinski noted in the Garza case, 11 Where, as here, 
the record shows that racial or ethnic communities were split to 
assure a safe seat for an incumbent, there is a strong inference --
indeed a presumption -- that this was the result of intentional 
discrimination ... ~~ /3/ 
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But these calls can be close ones. In another area of the Senate 
plan in Louisiana we did not object to the state's rejection of a 
proposed minority district in Jefferson Parish. It appeared that, 
among other things, the proposed district would have had an odd, 
somewhat tortured shape; its creation would have divided the 
community of Algiers among three districts, even though Algiers had 
traditionally been maintained in a single district and the people of 
Algiers wanted it to remain that way. It would not be appropriate to 
say the Legislature in that instance acted with an invidious racial 
purpose. 
Last Sunday evening, the Louisiana Legislature passed, and Gov. 
Roemer, signed new plans for each House and we are currently 
reviewing them with an eye toward the legislative election scheduled 
for this October. 
In Mississippi, we objected to the plans for the state House and 
Senate because the evidence indicated that the Legislature had 
deliberately fragmented black population concentrations in order to 
dilute minority voting strength. In reaching this conclusion, we 
re 1 i ed in part on the fact that compact and contiguous minority 
districts could easily have been created but were not and the 
Legislature had no plausible, non-racial explanation for its 
actions. We also relied on evidence that support for the submitted 
plans and opposition to the principal alternative plans often were 
characterized by overt racial appeals. 
In several instances, the state argued that its plan did in fact 
create viable minority districts where blacks comprised 60 percent 
or more of the voting age population. But raw numbers alone can be 
misleading. We looked, as we also do, behind the numbers to the 
underlying facts. We uncovered evidence that blacks in those 
districts would not be a majority of the likely voters. In one 
district, for example, a critical number of blacks were inmates in 
a state prison who, of course, cannot vote. In another, they were 
college students who would not be in the area at the time of the 
August primary. In others, critical numbers of blacks had low 
turnout rates because they lived in isolated rural areas, far from 
the polls and without cars or access to public transportation. 
After our objection, the Mississippi Legislature failed to agree on 
a new plan and a three-judge court was convened to fashion a map. 
That court, which is still working on a new districting plan, 
recently decided to hold elections in 1991 under the districting 
lines and to hold special elections under a new map in 1992. 
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In Virginia, the state plan created 11 minority House districts. 
Alternatives proposed by the NAACP, the Republican Party and the 
ACLU would have provided for 13 minority districts. The state's main justification for refusing to create the two additional districts 
was that the state plan had been drafted by the Legislative Black 
Caucus. We were not convinced, however, that the decision to reject 
the two additional minority districts originated entirely with the 
Black Caucus or that their endorsement of the state plan negated the 
possibility of a deliberate design to protect incumbents at the 
expense of minority representation. 
The state also argued that it had refused to create a proposed 
minority district in the Richmond area because the creation of that 
district would have endangered a minority incumbent in Richmond. Our 
analysis indicated that the minority incumbent would still have been 
in a viable minority district under the alternative plan -- albeit 
not one as much to her 1 i king. Under those circumstances, we 
concluded that protection of the incumbent minority legislator was 
not a valid reason for rejecting an alternative that would have 
given minority voters outside of her district an opportunity to 
elect candidates of their choice. 
Along the southern border of Virginia the circumstances were 
different and, although it was a close question, we concluded that 
the state did have valid reasons for not creating yet another 
proposed minority Senate district in the Danville area. Among other 
things, the district lines under the alternative plan for that area 
would have fractured two independent cities. 
I should add that our objection in Virginia was very narrowly 
focused. The state was able to remedy the problem quickly and 
without disrupting other parts of its plan. We gave the state's 
revised submission priority attention and, I am happy to say, we 
were able to pre-clear it within 24 hours of its submission. 
In New York City, the situation was not simply black and white. 
Rather, due to large numbers of Asians and Hispanics, the situation 
was black, brown, yellow and white, which immeasurably complicated 
our task and the task of the New York City districting commission. 
We found that blacks and Asians had been treated fairly but that 
Hispanic voting strength had been diluted, apparently as the result 
of an effort to augment black voting strength. 
The proposed map for the New York City Council created only six 
viable Hispanic districts out of a total of 51, even though 
Hispanics constituted approximately one quarter of the city's 
population -- but only 15 percent of the registered voters. There 
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were two other districts in which Hispanics constituted a majority 
of the voting age population but only a slim plurality of the 
registered voters. Our analysis indicated that there was a 
significant risk that Hispanics would not be able to elect 
candidates of their choice in those districts because of a number of 
factors, including their lower turnout rate. 
These concerns had been brought to the attention of the districting 
commission by members of the Hispanic community but the districting 
commission had rejected proposals to add Hispanic voters to those 
districts. Our task was to decide whether the commission had been 
motivated, in whole or in art, by a discriminatory purpose or 
whether the commission had acted for a valid, non-racial reason. The 
commission argued that it has a valid reason, namely to avoid 
weakening Hispanic majorities in adjacent areas. Our analysis, 
however, revealed that changes could be made that would not endanger 
the adjacent Hispanic districts. There was also evidence that 
Hispanics had not been treated as fairly as other groups in the 
districting process and that the commission appeared to be making 
choices throughout its plan, including areas of the city not covered 
by Section 5, that consistently disfavored Hispanics. Based on the 
totality of the circumstances, we concluded that the commission did 
not have valid reasons for rejecting the proposals to strengthen the 
marginal Hispanic districts and giving the Hispanic voters in those 
districts a real opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. 
Accordingly, we interposed an objection. 
Again, I would like to note that our objections in New York were 
very narrowly focused and easily remedied. Within a week, the 
commission was able to agree upon changes that met our objections 
without significantly disrupting the remainder of the plan. As was 
the case with Virginia, we gave the revised submission priority 
attention and we were able to pre-clear on the same day it was 
submitted. 
let me hasten to add that these examples are given not to highlight 
the racial discrimination in Louisiana, or in Virginia, or in 
Mississippi or in New York City. Rather, I offer these examples 
merely to help guide you as you wrestle with various aspects of the 
very difficult process of redistricting in your own state. 
In closing, let me say that we understand the problems that you face 
in attempting to devise and enact new districting plans. Census data 
may be late and not as complete or accurate as we all would like. 
Tight time frames will govern the redistricting process. Various 
interest groups and commentators will be pulling you in different 
directions as once. But I believe that together we can ensure that 
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the coming round of redistricting efforts will produce plans that 
provide the full measure of fairness to racial and language 
minorities required by the Voting Rights Act and the Constitution. 
As President Johnson said when the act was passed 26 years ago, 
discrimination in voting is a wrong which no American, in his heart, 
can justify. The right to vote is one which no American, true to our 
principles, can deny. 
Let us all work hard -- and together -- to achieve that cherished 
goal. I think we can do it. 
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Footnotes 
1/ Covered states are Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas and Virginia. In addition, 
New Mexico is covered by the pre-clearance requirement of 
Section 3 (c) as a result of litigation successfully 
challenging its post-1980 legislative redistricting plan. 
2/ Certain counties in the following states are covered: 
California, Florida, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, North 
Carolina and South Dakota. 
3/ Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(Opinion of Kozinski J. concurring in part and dissenting in 
part.) 
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Source: NCSL Reapportionment Law Update, Summer 1991 
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Status of Reapportionment Legislation 
The following are the reapportionment bills introduced last 
session and pending before the General Assembly. 
House Reapportionment Bill (H.3834, Rep. Wilkins). This legislation 
reapportions the S.C. House of Representatives in accordance with the 1990 
U.S. Census figures. According to the Census figures, each House district 
should have a population of 28,118 in order to comply with the federal 
court "one man, one vote" rulings. Although the total number of House 
districts stays at 124, two new districts have been created -- one in 
Dorchester and the other mostly in Harry County. 
Status: Passed the House 5-29-91; pending in the Senate 
Judiciary Committee. 
House, Senate and Congressional Reapportionment (S.1003, Senate 
Judiciary Committee). This legislation would reapportion the state 
Senate, House and U.S. Congressional districts according to the 1990 U.S. 
Census figures. All three redistricting plans would be incorporated into 
this one bill, instead of separate legislation for each. The bill contains 
descri pt i ens of the Senate and congressi anal redistricting plans, as 
passed by the Senate. The House redistricting section is left blank. 
Status: Passed the Senate 5-28-91; pending in the House 
Judiciary Committee. 
Conqressi onal Reapportionment (H. 3836, Rep. Wilkins). This bi 11 
provides for the reapportionment of the congressional districts according 
to the 1990 U.S. Census. Un 1 ike other states whose population changes 
requires them to add or lose a congressional district, South Carolina will 
continue to have six congressional districts. 
Status: Pending in the House Judiciary Committee. 
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